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I. Introduction
As the HIV / AIDS situation in sub-Saharan Africa (sSA) goes on, families ,
institutions and governments face difficult decisions as to allocating
resources toward the care of those suffering from diseases. Countries
within sSA follow the British model of socialized medicine. Although
private institutions operate centers of health care, eighty-five percent of the
people in these countries depend solely on the government plan for their
health care.' Unlike developed countries (e.g., the United States) where
AIDS has evolved into a chronic disease,2 in sSA AIDS is an end-stage
terminal illness. With skyrocketing infection rates, communities in this
region must balance their expenses meeting health care needs against the
need to develop the infrastructure, food production and educational
systems for the sake of future generations. The health care delivery
systems in these regions are in crisis due to inadequate funding , scarcity of
trained personnel, inadequate clean water supplies, high population
growth, poor hygiene, high levels of illiteracy and poverty.)
Drawing from Catholic teaching, this paper acknowledges that these
communities are obliged to provide pain relief for these victims. For
reasons that will be studied in detail, treatments beyond thi s should be
regarded as extraordinary, and therefore not an obligation. This is based on
the fact that ordinary means of treatment are relative to the availability of
resources. The resources in the sub-Saharan region are not sufficient to
provide any treatment beyond pain relief.
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This paper's focus is on Catholic teaching pertaining to morally
necessary measures to prolong life in the HIV/AIDS epidemic in subSaharan Africa. The discussion will begin with the development of
Catholic teaching on prolonging life and will continue with the principles
of ordinary and extraordinary means. Then, these principles will be applied
to the socioeconomic conditions in sSA.

II. Development of Catholic Principles of Life Prolonging Measures
The present magisterial teaching of the Catholic Church on
prolonging life has developed from the work of 16th and 17th century
theologians. 4 Church teachings have gained a new sense of moral
importance, particularly in light of 20th century medical advances that
successfully treat illnesses that previously were fatal. This renewed focus
resulted in the development of present day magisterial declarations that
provide guidance on moral situations involving treatments to prolong life.
One of the earliest Church teachings on measures to prolong life was
that of the 16th century Spanish Dominican theologian Francisco de
Vitoria. He addressed the issue of when the refusal of food by an ill person
violates the natural law obligation to preserve one's life. 5 De Vitoria
argued that if taking food held out the hope of prolonging an ill person 's
life, then that person is morally obligated to take food. However, if the
illness has so depressed the person 's spirit that taking food would be
torturous, then eating is considered a moral impossibility. Under those
circumstances, de Vitoria taught, refusing to eat is not a mortal sin,
especially where there is little possibility that life will be extended. 6 He
further taught that one's obligation to eat does not create an obligation to
obtain specific foods that may be expensive or difficult to obtain, even if by
obtaining these foods, a person's life could be extended.? De Vitoria's final
teaching on prolonging life also discusses the use of pharmaceutical
treatments. In this teaching, de Vitoria suggests that a person is not morally
obligated to take every possible measure to conserve life. The obligation
to accept treatment has limits. One is not obligated to expend the family
assets on a treatment that will prolong life but not cure the disease. Nor is
one obligated to accept a novel treatment because of the possibility that it
could extend one's life. The obligation is simply to accept those
commonly available remedies. For de Vitoria, then, the obligation to
accept medical treatment turns on the treatment's costs and effectiveness.
De Vitoria's teachings have become fundamental principles of
Catholic teaching on prolonging life. For example, the Catholic Church
teaches that life is a gift from God and one is required to take normal
measures to preserve one's life.
However, it recognizes certain
circumstances in which this obligation becomes a moral impossibility, for
16
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example, where there is great fear, danger, or burden. As a result, the
person is excused because the obligation is deemed excessively difficult to
meet. s Further, the Church teaches that one's obligation to preserve life is
a limited obligation. There is no obligation to employ all possible means
necessary to prolong one's life, but only those commonly available and
financially affordable. Also, the obligation to seek out treatment is limited
to those treatments that provide a reasonable hope of the benefit of
returning one to a normal healthy state.
One of the later theologians who expanded the teaching of de Vitoria
was a Dominican theologian, Domingo Banez (1528-1604), who
introduced the concepts of "ordinary and extraordinary" in the assessment
of the morality of prolonging treatment. Banez argued that an individual is
responsible for preserving life by "common food and clothing, common
medicines, a certain common and ordinary pain; not, however, to a certain
extraordinary and horrible pain, nor to expenses which are extraordinary in
proportion to the status of this man."9 Even though there have been critics 10 of
the ordinary and extraordinary distinction, the use of these concepts has
continued to be an important aspect of the debates on prolonging life.
The ordinary-extraordinary principle continued to be developed
through the teachings of the Spanish theologian, Cardinal John de Lugo.
De Lugo taught that preserving one's life is a moral obligation. Not to do
so is equivalent to taking one's own life. De Lugo's teachings differed
from those of his predecessors in one important aspect. He taught that
when treatment does not provide reasonable hope of benefit, then there is
no obligation to accept even ordinary treatment. II De Lugo further teaches
that there is never an obligation to accept extraordinary means to preserve
one's life, regardless of the possible benefit. 12 For de Lugo, there is a
distinction between contributing to your death by refusing ordinary
treatments and allowing deaths to occur by refusing extraordinary
treatments. 13 The first is immoral under certain circumstances, and the
second is not. De Lugo's teachings laid the foundation for the modem day
distinction between suicide and euthanasia and allowing death to occur.
Further, de Lugo's teachings also established the relativity l4 of what is
ordinary and extraordinary because it is determined, in part, by one's
financial circumstances and geographic location, as well as advances in
medical treatment.
Following de Lugo's contributions, the debate on prolonging life did
not receive much attention until the 20th century Jesuit theologian Gerald
Kelly addressed it in his influential writings. Kelly's contributions to the
debate included defining the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary"
treatments. Ordinary treatments included those treatments that were
obtainable without great difficulty. Extraordinary treatments included those
that were excessively difficult to obtain, repugnant, or expensive. "In other
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words, an extraordinary means is one which prudent men would consider
at least morally impossible with reference to the duty of preserving one's
life," 's Like de Lugo, Kelly argues that there is no moral obligation to
accept ordinary treatment when there is little hope of benefit. 16
Kell y's definition of ordinary and extraordinary treatment became
widely accepted when Pope Pius XII adopted Kelly 's definitions in his
1957 address to the International Congress of Anesthesiologists. In this
address, Pope Pius drew heavily on the works of Vito ria, Banez, de Lugo
and Kelly. He stated:
Natural reason and Christian morals say that man (and whosoever is
entrusted with the task of taking care of his fellow man) has the right
and duty in case of serious illness to take the necessary treatment for
the preservation of life and health . .. But normally one is held to use
only ordinary means - according to circumstances of persons, places,
times and culture - that is to say, means that do not involve any
grave burden for oneself or another. A more strict obligation would
be too burdensome for most men and would render the attainment of
the higher, more important good too difficult. Life, health, all
temporal activities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends. On the
other hand, one is not forbidden to take more than the strictl y
necessary steps to preserve life and health, as long as he does not fail
in some more serious duty.17

Therefore, according to Pius XII, there are circumstances in which it
may be immoral to seek out extraordinary treatments in order to preserve
one's life . For example, if an ill person is married, with young children,
and the extraordinary treatment available would result in the devastation of
the family 's finances, to the extent that there would be no ability to provide
for the minor children, obtaining the extraordinary treatment would be
immoral , unless there is a high probability the treatment will return the ill
person to health. Pius XII also introduced another important component of
modem Church teaching. The obligation to preserve and advance one's
physical well being is not greater than the obligation to preserve and
advance one's spiritual rel ationship with God. To the extent that
preserving life diminishes one's spiritual relationship, then the
preservation of physical life becomes an immoral act.
Pius XII's teachings imply that medical treatment is to be evaluated
in the context of the patient's overall medical condition and the patient's
ability to pursue a spiritual relationship. Therefore, ordinary treatment is
that which offers a reasonable hope of benefit and does not diminish one's
ability to engage in a relationship with God and does not impose an
excessive burden on the family of the ill person. Treatment that meets
these qualifications imposes a moral obligation on the ill person to accept.
18
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The Church teaching on prolonging life received further attention in
the Declaration on Euthanasia , drafted in 1980 by the Congregation For
the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF). The extent to which the early writings of
Vitoria, Banez and de Lugo had influenced the Church is clearly seen in the
Declaration's teaching. In this Declaration, the terms "ordinary" and
"extraordinary" were replaced with the terms "proportionate" and
"disproportionate." However, as used, the terms are synonymous. As
analyzed by CDF, the complexity, risk, and cost of treatment must be
considered in determining whether a treatment is proportionate or
disproportionate. Also, the degree of possible benefit to the patient that use
of the treatment will afford must be determined. Further, the patient's
financial resources must be a critical part of the analysi s in determining
whether a proposed treatment is proportionate or not. Finally, CDF states
as an absolute that when death is imminent, withholding or removing life
support treatment is acceptable when continuing treatment would "only
secure precarious and burdensome prolongation of life."1 8
In short, Catholic teaching regards human life as a gift that imposes a
responsibility on the individual to care for it. The responsibility commands
upon people the duty to apply medical measures or treatments that conserve
life. 19 However, the teaching does not advocate for the piteous and expensive
prolongation of life through new medical advancements, "once the
summons to eternity is clear and final."20 Applied to terminal illness that
has no hope of a cure, Church teaching then holds that there is no moral
obligation to receive treatment merely to delay death for a short time.

III. Ordinary and Extraordinary Treatment and the Futility Debate

In the previous section we discussed the historical development of
the Church's teaching on prolonging life. In this section we will focus
more closely on the meaning of the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary"
and use them to evaluate the debate on treatment futility. This discussion
will lay the framework for our later discussion on which treatments are to
be categorized as ordinary and extraordinary in the context of the HIV /
AIDS epidemic in sSA.
A. Ordinary Treatment
Ethical considerations of which treatments are determined to be
ordinary focus on the treatments ' potential benefits to the patient and the
burden imposed through obtaining the treatment. In determining the
potential benefit of a treatment, the focus must be on the good of the
patient as a whole, and not just what is good for this or that organ system
individually. As stated by Gerald Kelly, ordinary treatments "are all
medicines, treatments, and operations which offer reasonable hope of
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benefit for the patient and which can be obtained and used without
excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience."21 While it is clear that
medical treatment must provide a hope of benefit before one is obligated to
accept it, the sticking point is understanding what is meant by "reasonable
hope of benefit." Kelly' s writings show that defining the term is not an
easy task Y Kelly offers some guidance in that he seems to emphasize the
need to focus on benefit to the patient as a whole as the first determinant of
what is to be considered ordinary or extraordinary treatment as opposed to
the particular illness being treated Y Church teaching on this issue is less
clear. However, from the medical perspective, a treatment is beneficial
when it restores one's health, relieves one's pain, improves one's physical
mobility, returns one to consciousness, enables one to communicate with
others, and so on.
Catholic teaching also recognizes all of these as beneficial, but it
specifies that for a treatment to be beneficial, it must improve one's
physical, mental and emotional condition to the point that one is able to
pursue the spiritual goods of life, at least at a minimal level without
experiencing significant burdens. In determining whether the burdens
expetienced as a result of accepting treatment are significant, it is
necessary to view the quality of life the patient will experience during and
as a result of the treatment, its costs and the ease of access to the treatment,
and the financial condition of the patient's family. 24 In short, the treatment
is burdensome unless it is obtainable with relative convenience. 25

B. Extraordinary Treatment
The essential element of extraordinary treatment is the matter of
what constitutes a moral impossibility for human beings in general or for a
particular person in a given circumstance. There are five general elements
to be considered in determining whether treatment is extraordinary. The
first is whether the treatment is impossible to obtain or whether the ability
to use it is unattainable. The second is whether the treatment requires
excessive effort. An example would be undergoing a long journey or
enduring a long and burdensome convalescence. The third element is
whether the treatment requires a patient to endure considerable pain and
di scomfort. An example of this is when a patient is going through
chemotherapy. The fourth element to be considered is whether the
treatment is excessively expensive, taking into consideration the patient's
economic status and country of origin. This fourth consideration is subject
to criticism because it fails to advocate for equal access to health care by all
persons. The final element is whether the treatment causes the patient fear
or repugnance to such a degree that it is burdensome for the patient to
endure the treatment. Amputation procedures and, in some cultures,
receiving treatment from female doctors are examples where fear and
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repugnance can render a treatment extraordinary. While the pain factor in
amputation procedures has been alleviated through modern medical
techniques, repugnance at the idea of living with a mutilated body would
still make the procedure extraordinary for some, especially in situations
where a di sabled individual is a burden to his or her family.
In short, jUdging whether a means is extraordinary or not requires an
evaluation of the treatment's effectiveness, the burden on the patient, and
the burden on his or her community. This evaluation requires an inquiry
into the patient's emotions and whether the patient and the community
have the means to acquire the treatment without denying others access to
basic necessities. Examples of such include education, food and shelter.
Therefore, an evaluation of extraordinary means includes an understanding
of a patient's responsibility to seek out reasonable care and not to seek out
care that would require the patient to forsake hi s or her obligations to
others.
In situations where a patient is determined to seek out
extraordinary treatment at the expense of his or her obligations to others,
and the patient's finances cannot cover treatment expenses, then it can be
argued that the financier of the treatment has an equal obligation to
determine whether, in light of all elements discussed, the treatment is
extraordinary. One element to be considered by a third-party financier is
whether payment of another's AIDS-related medical expenses will deplete
the financier 's resources to the point that he or she is unable to meet other
responsibilities, such as food , lodging, clothing and education for other
family members. If it is determined to be extraordinary, then the financier
has a moral obligation to withhold funds.

C. Medical Futility
At least in the United States, contemporary ethical futility debates
have surfaced because factors such as quality of life, cost containment,
gender, wealth, and patient's age impact physicians' decisions to withhold
or withdraw treatments.26 Often these decisions would be made without
involving the patient or the family. Because of the manner in which futility
decisions had been made by physicians, both the public and patient
autonomy advocates began expressing increased concern over the need to
develop a clear working definition of medical futility that included the
required involvement of patients or guardians Y The need for a
comprehensive medical futility definition has taken on renewed emphasis
in the present environment of medical malpractice litigation.
The term "futility" derives from the Latin word utilis, meaning
something that cannot achieve the desired effect through an intrinsic
failure. Because of the inability to affect the desired objective, the action is
useless. In the context of medical treatment, there is no clear consensus on
a definition for medical futility. The concern is that by defining the term, a
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doctor's ability to apply his or her knowledge and experience to a medical
condition and determine the best course of action to be followed will be
undermined. If a treatment were to fall within an adopted futility definition,
then it is possible that a doctor would be prevented from using it.
While no formal definition exists, many medical associations have
appli ed their collective experience in providing guidance as to what types
of treatment would be futile . For example, focu sing solely on cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), the American Thoracic Society believes
that CPR is a futile treatment in those circumstances when, in all
probability, its application will not result in a meaningful survival for the
pat ient. 28 The American Medical Association (AMA) Council on Judicial
and Ethical Affairs differs from the Thoracic Society. The AMA Council
considers CPR to be futile when it fail s to achieve its physical intended
purpose, restoration of cardiac activity.29
The debate regarding what is considered a futile treatment is
illustrated in the above examples. For the Thoracic Society, the focus is on
qu alitative results. The AMA focu ses on the quantitative results. Another
definition focu ses on the probability of success, citing those treatments
employed to "achieve a result that is possible but that reasoning or
experience suggests is hi ghly improbable and that cannot be systematically
produced."30 Others consider futile treatments to be those through which
the pain and suffering experience makes the treatment more burdensome
than beneficial. 31
Two renowned bioethici sts, Tom L. Beauchamp and James F.
Childress, suggest that a futile treatment is one that has no possibility of
being efficac ious or is not capable of producing a desired effect. 32 These
authors implicitly incorporate the burdensome, quantitative and qualitative
perspectives of other physicians and ethicists into their concept of
efficaciousness.33 In this way, it is the most encompassing proposed
definition for futile medical treatment. Regardless of which model you
appl y, there is a general consensus that in pronounced cases of futile
medi cal treatment, where the treatment will not even achieve the desired
ph ysical result, a physician is not morally or legally bound to provide it. 34
Some writers argue that not only are physicians not morally or
legall y bound, but that they further have a social and moral duty not to
ad minister futile medical measures for the following reasons:
( 1) It would be an irresponsible waste of resources, especially where
nati ons follow a rationing system
(2) Patients with means would simpl y change doctors or institutions
un ti l they found one who would provide the futile treatment, thereby
undermining the futility paradi gm, as well as needed uniform medical
standards in societies.
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(3) Providing a futile treatment would give false hope to the patient
and family, leading to inevitable disappointments and, at the same time,
creating false expectations in the general community regarding what
scientific medical advances are able to achieve. 35
These arguments can also be applied to sub-Saharan African nations
and communities in their effort to provide health care to AIDS end-stage
terminal illnesses. In the above discussion on futile medical treatment, the
focus is on the physician who determines whether a treatment is
quantitatively futile and the patient who determines whether a treatment is
burdensome or qualitatively futile. However, in the context of sSA where
the government and communities bear the burden of paying for HIV / AIDS
treatment, the understanding of medical futility needs to be expanded to
incorporate the perspective of the one allocating resources in order to pay
for the treatment.
This is similar to the situation of an insurance company examining a
treatment and designating it experimental, and therefore, not covered.
Similarly, it is akin to socialized medicine in Canada or the United
Kingdom, where the government determines what procedures will be
covered, by means of treatment rationing. However, the need to draw
futility distinctions in sSA based on communal costs versus patient
benefits is significantly elevated because of the extreme poverty, the high
percentage of HIV / AIDS infection as well as other diseases, such as
malaria and tuberculosis, and the resulting drain they have on the limited
resources of sSA communities and governments.

IV. sSA Economic Conditions
Africa starts the 21st centUlY as the poorest, the most
technologically backward, the most debt distressed. and the most
marginalized region in the world. It accounts for 12.5% of the
world's population but produces only 3.7% of global GDP 36
The biggest challenge facing sSA countries is allocation of limited
resources. Major problems include fighting containable insect-borne and
communicable diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis; treating
nutrition-related illnesses; fighting the AIDS epidemic; treating HIV / AIDS
victims; and building an infrastructure that will allow for increased
economic growth and education. In order to comprehend the magnitude of
this challenge, it is necessary to understand the present economic
conditions of sSA countries.
Fourteen of the world's poorest countries are in sSA. The gross
national product per capita in sSA ranged from US$130 to US$200. 37 In
February, 2004
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the early 1990s, the economic growth rate of this region averaged 1.5%,
the lowest in the world. 38 In 1995, fifty-two percent of sSA's population
survived on one dollar per day.39 As a result of the extreme poverty of this
region, malnutrition-related illnesses are commonplace. "Chronic protein
and micronutrient malnutrition is associated with stunting and wasting and
with many diseases, some of them deadly: blindness, chronic diarrhea,
acute respiratory infections, goiter, anemia, and more."40 Seventy percent
of the population depends on agriculture for their livelihood, yet over the
past fifty years, more than 650 million square kilometers of farmland have
been lost to desertification. 41 Even with the devastation the AIDS epidemic
has inflicted on the population of the area, the population continues to
grow at a rate faster than any other developing region: 3.2% as compared
to 2.1 % in Latin America and 1.8 in Asia. 42 The educational system is
virtually nonexistent for the majority of the children in sSA. Eighty
million children have no access to elementary school and only 2% of the
population attends institutions of higher education. 43 The drain on this
region 's resources is further complicated by the high incidence of malaria
infections, which kills more than one million people in sSA annually, and
tuberculosis, which infected 864,000 sSA people in 1999 alone. 44
In short, sSA populations are poor and the government resources
available to assist citizens are insufficient to meet even the more
fundamental needs such as food and education. Against this backdrop, the
HIV / AIDS epidemic continues to devastate the population of sSA. In
2000 alone, 2.4 million people in sSA died of AIDS-related illnesses, while
another 3.4 million became infected. 45 UNAIDS estimates that there are
34 million people infected with the HIV / AIDS virus. Of that number, 23
million live in sSA. 46 The impact on the families of AIDS victims is not
limited to emotional impact. For example, it is estimated that by 2005 , 4.2
million sSA children will be orphaned as a consequence of AIDS.47 Not
only does AIDS result in people being widowed and orphaned, but perhaps
more significantly is the financial toll as a family 's income is typically
reduced by more than half when the infected member becomes disabled or
dies. 48
In addition to its impact on families, the AIDS epidemic is also
affecting the economic growth of these countries. One report estimates that
the AIDS epidemic will be the decisive factor in these already impoverished
economies, which are expected to shrink by approximately 25 % over the
next 20 years. Further, the potential to develop is being devastated in these
countries. The impact on the labor force alone is terrible. For example, the
life expectancy of the average sSA worker has declined by more than 20
years because of the AIDS crisis. Consequently, the ability for firms to
compete has been significantly compromised because of the increased
expenditures due to increased health care costs and the need to replace
24
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employees. At the same time, revenues are decreasing because of the
effect that absenteeism and allocation of resources to employee training are
having on productivity.49
One of the many problems facing sSA is the cost of drugs that are
used to treat AIDS patients. Merck and Bristol-Meyers have cut their
prices in order to make AIDS drugs more affordable in sSA. 50 AIDS
cocktails in sSA now cost US$500-600 per person per year. 51 An lndianbased generic drug manufacturer, Cipla, Ltd., now offers generic versions
of eight of fifteen HIV cocktail drugs to sSA governments at an even more
reduced price of $350 per person per year. 52

V. Application of the Principles of Ordinary and Extraordinary
Treatment and Medical Futility to HIV/ AIDS in sSA
A person is regarded as having AIDS when his or her CD4+ cell
count drops below 200 cells/mm3 of blood count (normal CD4+ count is
1000) or when CD4+ cells comprise less than 14% of the individual 's total
lymphocytes. 53
Standard treatment in Western countries for HIV I AIDS patients is a
15 drug regimen known as the AIDS cocktail, which has proven to reduce
transmission of the HIV virus. The cocktails are grouped into three
classes: nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs), nonnucleoside
reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NNRTIs), and protetease inhibitors (PIs).54
Because of the patient's deteriorating immune system, the patient is at risk
for contracting opportunistic diseases seldom seen in individuals with
healthy immune systems. Use of the cocktail during this phase can help to
elevate white blood cell levels, thereby slowing the deterioration of the
immune system. It has proven to be an effective treatment for prolonging
HIVI AIDS patients' lives. However, the cocktail regimen's side effects are
similar to that of chemotherapy and unlike cancer treatment, the cocktail
has to be taken for the duration of the AIDS patient's life.
As already stated, this treatment is expensive. For sSA populations,
even having access at the reduced prices now available, the cocktail is still
cost prohibitive. The alternative to the cocktail is the use of a single drug
and this approach has proven to be ineffective because of the speed with
which the body becomes resistant to the drug. At most, use of a single drug
showed an effectiveness of one to two years. Understanding the cost and
effectiveness of treatment is critical in determining whether the available
treatments should be considered ordinary or extraordinary in the contexts
of AIDS in sSA. So far, almost no attention has been given to this
important and challenging project of assisting communities to come up
with medical spending decisions.
February, 2004
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Other components are also necessary in evaluating how AIDS
treatment should be categorized. Because of the impoverished conditions
of these communities, there is no guarantee of supply. Once a person starts
taking the cocktail, or even an individual drug, it is important that the
patient remain faithful to the regimen because otherwise resistance to the
drug(s) will develop. As a result, should the patient resume treatment, the
effectiveness of the regimen is reduced. Also, even if supply can be
guaranteed, the impoverished conditions of most AIDS patients in sSA
coupled with their lack of education and the harshness of the side effects of
the drug(s) makes it questionable whether the patients themselves will be
faithful to the regimen. Finally, the lack of infrastructure and skilled
medical personnel makes it difficult for patients on the drug regimen to
have the necessary access to medical resources that will allow them to
receive follow-up medical care and consultation. The depletion in medical
personnel is due to many doctors and nurses leaving sSA to practice in
Western countries. Many of those who remained have, themselves, fallen
victim to the AIDS epidemic. In fact, access to doctors is so limited that, in
this commentator's personal experience, it is not uncommon for nurses in
sSA to prescribe medication.
Applying the ordinary/extraordinary principles to the reality of AIDS
in sSA, treatment for AIDS either using the cocktail or even the individual
drug regimen should be termed extraordinary treatment. The fact that even
using the most effective treatment currently available can only guarantee
the progress of the disease will be delayed and the fact that the treatment
must be taken for life strongly supports this position . The cost of the
treatment is depleting the meager resources of families, communities, and
governments. Other pressing concerns affecting the entire population are
at risk of being abandoned because of the high cost of treatment.
Applying the guidelines provided above, it is the moral
responsibility of all people to seek that care which is reasonable under the
circumstances. One element in determining what is reasonable is the
burden the treatment places on those for whom the patient is responsible.
Given the economic conditions in sSA , the burden on family and
community is too great for it to be moral to divert resources to the
treatment of HIV / AIDS patients. If a patient without financial resources
seeks out treatment at the communities' expense, then it becomes the
responsibility of the community to withhold the finances needed to obtain
treatment .
If the present drug regimens are deemed extraordinary, then what
treatment is ordinary? The treatment that is considered to be ordinary is
that treatment which is within the financial means of the community, taking
into consideration the needs of the community. In the situation of sSA,
ordinary means would be those pain medications financially affordable,

26

Linacre Quarterly

that will enable the AIDS patient to be as comfortable as possible and when
the end comes, help the person to die in comfort and with dignity.
This position is equally supported by the medical futility principle. As
previously stated, a treatment is medically futile if it is unable to achieve its
intended end or if its burden on the patient outweighs the benefits. While most
scholars focus on the physician and the patient as determining which
treatment is futile, in the case of sSA, I would expand this to include the
financier of the treatment, in most cases the family and/or the government.
I would also add as a component of medical futility the burden to the
community in light of the present inability to cure the patient of the illness.
It is clearly established that the cost of the cocktail makes that
treatment un affordable for sSA populations. Even if it could be made
affordable, issues of supply and willingness to remain faithful to the
treatment make it highly improbable that the treatment is able to achieve its
intended purpose, substantial prolongation of life. The use of a single drug
is of greater futility because even under the best of circumstances, its
benefits to the patient are minimal. The cost to the family and community,
however, continues to be disproportionately high.
In the event a cure is found, the analysis would be different. While
the cost would certainly be high, it would not entail a commitment to a
treatment lasting the lifetime of each AIDS patient in a given community.
Also, the ability for each of these individuals to return to a productive
condition because of being cured would change the equation. However,
given the high numbers of infected individuals, 23 million as of the year
2000, even in the event of a cure, difficult decisions would most likely
need to be made as to priority of receipt of treatment. The high cost
associated with distributing any curative treatment and the fragile and
impoverished infrastructure of these regions would certainly require
somebody having to decide who will receive the curative treatment to live
and who will be left to die.

VI. Conclusion
The problem of HIV / AIDS in sSA is challenging the traditional ways
of caring for terminally ill patients. One of these challenges in providing
health care, especially to AIDS victims, is the problem of cost containment.
This paper has discussed the application of the Catholic Church's
casuistic method of ordinary and extraordinary medical procedure as one
of the ways sSA communities and governments can solve the problem of
cost containment. We have argued that the ordinary means of caring for
terminal AIDS patients is pain relief medical care. AIDS patients are
intrinsically valuable even when they are dying. While we cannot dispute
this fact, according to the traditional Catholic teaching on prolonging life,
February, 2004
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there are times when human life must be sacrificed for other goods. For
example, there is no moral obligation to continue disproportionate highcost treatments if there is no hope of a cure. At times, death becomes
something we might choose rather than something that happens to us. To
date, the question of what treatment obligations are owed to AIDS victims
is one that has been ignored by both the governments and the religious
communities. Most pastoral letters issued by the Catholic Church, for
example, deal with the morality of condom use and sexual promiscuity.55
However, to date, no Bishops' Conference has addressed the morality issue
concerning whether it is necessary to provide treatment to AIDS victims at
the cost of further depleting the already scare resources of the
communities.
A comprehensive approach to providing medical care to the AIDS
epidemic in sSA must not only address moral and social issues. Economic
issues, such as planning medical spending decisions, must be regarded as
very critical especially at this time when there is no vaccine or cure for
HIV I AIDS. In failing to do this, the results will jeopardize everything the
economically disadvantaged societies of sub-Saharan Africa have achieved
ever since the end of colonial political, economic, and religious
domination.
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